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"CAIN ROSE UP AGAINST His BROTHER ABEL AND KILLED




The world's first case of man slaying man,' and, indeed, the earliest
recorded crime,2 is dealt with in a series of terse verses in Genesis, the first of
the five Books of the Torah,3 the Jewish Bible:
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In our citations to Jewish law materials, we have used English translations whenever
possible, verifying their accuracy by comparing them with the original sources. In some cases,
however, this means that the same word will be transliterated differently by various translators.
For example, the Hebrew letter equivalents of"s" and "t" are sometimes used interchangeably.
With respect to Hebrew and Aramaic sources that have not been translated into English, we of
course vouch for the accuracy of the translations.
' See 9 MIDRASH RABBAH, Esther-Proem 10, at 10 (H. Freedman & Maurice Simon eds.,
3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter MIDRASH RABBAH] (asserting that God appointed "Cain the first of
slayers, Abel the first of all slain"); RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES) COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH,
Genesis 4:23, at 96 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1971) [hereinafter Ramban Commentary on the
Torah] (referring to Cain as "the first murderer"); 1 MIDRASH TANCHUMA, Lech Lechah 7, at
57 (Hanoch Zundel ed., 1968) (giving God's characterization of Cain as evil because he brought
the sword [killing] into the world).
2 It is the first crime unless, of course, one counts Adam's and Eve's disobedience to God
when they ate the forbidden fruit (Genesis 3:1-19).
' The term "Torah" comes from the Hebrew root meaning "to instruct." In Orthodox
Jewish legal discourse the Torah was received at Sinai, written by Moses at God's command.
See, e.g., Deuteronomy 31:24 (Moses "[wrote] the words of this Torah onto a book"); accord,
MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Book of Knowledge lb (Moses Hyamson trans., 1981).
Modem biblical scholarship, especially by Christian and non-Orthodox Jewish scholars,
conjectures that there were several stages of transmission, both oral and written, of the material
finally recorded in the Old Testament. E.g., BERNHARD W. ANDERSON, UNDERSTANDING THE
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1. Now the man had known his wife Eve, and she conceived
and bore Cain, saying, "I have acquired a man with [the
Lord]."
2. And additionally she bore his brother Abel. Abel became
a shepherd, and Cain became a tiller of the ground.
3. After a period of time, Cain brought an offering to [the
Lord] of the fruit of the ground;
4. and as for Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his
flock and from their choicest. [The Lord] turned to Abel
and to his offering,
5. but to Cain and his offering He did not turn. This annoyed
Cain exceedingly, and his countenance fell.
6. And [the Lord] said to Cain, "Why are you annoyed, and
why has your countenance fallen?
7. Surely, if you improve yourself, you will be forgiven. But
if you do not improve yourself, sin rests at the door. Its
desire is toward you, yet you can conquer it."
8. Cain spoke with his brother Abel. And it happened when
they were in the field, that Cain rose up against his brother
Abel and killed him.
9. [The Lord] said to Cain, "Where is Abel your brother?"
And he said, "I do not know. Am I my brother's keeper?"
10. Then He said, "What have you done? The blood of your
brother cries out to Me from the ground!
11. Therefore, you are cursed more than the ground, which
opened wide its mouth to receive your brother's blood from
your hand.
OLD TESTAMENT 19-23, 151-80, 289-90, 451-66 (4th ed. 1986); RICHARD E. FRIEDMAN, WHO
WROTE THE BIBLE? 24-32 (1987). Cf ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE GENESIS OF JUSTICE 16
(2000) (eschewing reliance on the" 'J author' "and the" 'E author' "to resolve conflicts in the
Genesis text, "[b]ecause I want to engage the [traditional] commentators and the text on the
terms accepted by their readers over the millennia").
Although generally it refers to the first five books of the Bible, "Torah" is also used in a
far broader sense, encompassing not only the "Prophets" and "Writings" segments of the Old
Testament, but also the entirety of Jewish religious learning, including, inter alia, the Talmud,
post-talmudic legislation and codes, medieval commentaries, midrashic literature and responsa.
In this article, however, we will use the word "Torah" in its limited sense, referring to the first
five books of the Old Testament.
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12. When you work the ground, it shall no longer yield its
strength to you. You shall become a vagrant and a wanderer
on earth."
13. Cain said to [the Lord], "Is my iniquity too great to be
borne?
14. Behold, You have banished me this day from the face of the
earth-can I be hidden from Your presence? I must become
a vagrant and a wanderer on earth; whoever meets me will
kill me!"
15. [The Lord] said to him, "Therefore, whoever slays Cain,
before seven generations have passed he will be punished."
And [the Lord] placed a mark upon Cain, so that none that
meet him might kill him.
16. Cain left the presence of [the Lord] and settled in the land of
Nod, east of Eden.4
Most authorities view Cain's act as murder.' For example, fast forward
fifty-seven centuries, 6 and consider the case of Will Borrer,7 charged with the
4 THE CHUMASH, Genesis 4:1-16, at 19-23 (Nosson Scherman ed. 1993). Unless otherwise
noted, quotations of the Torah in this article will be from this edition. "Chumash," the Hebrew
word meaning "five," is a synonym for the Torah, as is Pentateuch, its Greek counterpart.
The Torah, in its original form, has neither punctuation nor vowels, both of which can
alter meanings drastically. The translations of the Bible, initially into Aramaic and Greek and
thereafter into numerous languages including English, often resolve rather than preserve
ambiguities, thereby favoring one interpretation over another. This means that different English
translations will sometimes produce differing interpretations of the text. See, e.g., infra notes
160-67 and accompanying text, discussing the meaning ofthe "sevenfold punishment" described
in Genesis 4:15, as applying either to Cain or to the person who kills him.
s See, e.g., DAVID W. AMRAM, LEADING CASES IN THE BIBLE 34 (1905) ('The record of the
first murder case is found in the fourth chapter of Genesis"); DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 48-
59 ("Chapter 2. Cain Murders-and Walks"); DAVID MAX EICHHORN, CAIN: SON OF THE
SERPENT 62 (2d ed. 1985) ("Cain decided to murder Abel"); ALEXANDER FRANKLIN, SEVEN
MIRACLE PLAYS 23-37 (1963) (including one such medieval play entitled "Cain and Abel," that
depicts Cain as a premeditated murderer whose sacrificial tithe is solely the result of his religious
brother's persistent urging, and is given grudgingly, even shortchanging God; when Cain's
sacrifice is rejected, Abel says it is not his fault, and Cain attacks him with a bone, saying "So
may this cheek bone burst thy brain, That life and thee shall part in twain.... So lie down there
and take thy rest. And thus I rid me of a pest'); RICARDO J. QuINONES, THE CHANGES OF CAIN
3 (1991) (observing that "[tihe dramatic elements of the [Cain and Abel] story are powerful...
the first murder").
6 See, e.g., ELLIOT N. DORFF & ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING TREE-THE ROOTS AND
GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 6 (1988), noting that "tihe Jewish tradition has its own system for
numbering years from the date of the creation of the world, under which the first half of 1987
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murder of his neighbor, to whom he had previously complained about the
victim's cattle getting into his field. According to the prosecution, defendant
went into the field where the victim was plowing, laid in wait, and then shot
him. Borrer claimed self-defense, and he was convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to two years imprisonment.
On appeal, Borrer raised numerous points of error, including the
prosecutor's allegedly inflammatory remarks to the jury that the case reminded
him of the first "assassination," referring specifically to Cain and Abel.8 The
court rejected defendant's argument, reasoning that "the state's evidence, if
believed, would indicate that the homicide was an assassination,"9 whereas the
jury rejected that version of the events by finding Borrer guilty only of
manslaughter and assessing the lowest possible punishment. Consequently,
said the court, it was not likely that there was any impropriety in the remarks.'o
Improper or not," the prosecutor's argument and the events in Borrer do
resonate with the biblical account. And, as we shall see, just as the jury in that
case believed the defendant was guilty only of manslaughter and not murder,
there is a basis for viewing Cain's act in a similar way.
falls in the year 5747." To be sure, the Cain and Abel story has mythical dimensions (see, e.g.,
QUINONES, supra note 5, at 3: "Out of the vast repertoire of Western myth, one myth stands
apart for the extraordinary longevity and variousness of its appeal. This is the Cain-Abel
story... one of the defining myths of our culture."). It is, however, the traditional Jewish
version of which we write, and that tradition dates the crime as indicated in the text accompany-
ing this footnote. Even within the Jewish tradition, it should be noted, Cain and Abel have been
depicted as archetypes. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
See Borrer v. State, 204 S.W. 1003 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918).
See id. at 1004.
9 Id.
10 See id.
" There is a split as to whether prosecutorial reliance on biblical verses, such as "eye for
eye," is reversible error in capital cases. Compare State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543, 562 (N.C.
1994) (affirming death penalty even though the prosecutor had told the jury that "eye for eye"
was an appropriate basis for imposing capital punishment), and State v. Shum, 866 S.W.2d 447,
464-65 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (affirming first degree murder conviction and finding that
prosecutor's reliance on "eye for eye" during closing argument was not plain error), with People
v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 883-84 (Cal. 1992) (prohibiting either district attorney or defense
counsel from relying on Biblical authority in arguments to jury), and Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 599 A.2d 630,644 (Pa. 1991) (reversing death penalty and warning prosecutors that
using Biblical authority to get a death sentence is per se reversible error).
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II. CAIN AND ABEL UNDER
AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW
Pursuing this anachronistic exercise a bit further, let us consider the case
of People v. Cain, first according to contemporary American law, and then
under Jewish law. At least at first glance, one is struck by a jarring discrep-
ancy: In the biblical account, Cain's punishment was exile, 2 a seemingly
lenient sanction if the crime was in fact cold-blooded murder. 3 If modem
American law were applied, could such a slayer expect better or worse?
Would he fare as well as Borrer did? Of course, the result would turn largely
on the underlying facts and circumstances, which we have not yet explored,
but a lot would also depend on the jurisdiction in which Cain was brought to
trial.
Murder in the common law jurisdictions is typically defined as a malicious,
unlawful killing that requires either proof of intent to kill or to do grievous
bodily harm or proof of a depraved heart. 4 In such states, to establish murder
in the first degree, there is usually a requirement of deliberation or premedita-
tion, or of both elements," which are generally defined as cool reflection for
some period of time. 6 Without these mental states, the killing constitutes
murder in the second degree. 7 As we shall see, depending on which version
22 See infra notes 147-70 and accompanying text, discussing the nature of the sanction.
23 Professor Dershowitz is somewhat exercised by this ostensible divine leniency, especially
in comparison to the punishment meted out to Adam and Eve as a result of their fateful
encounter with the serpent and the fruit of the tree of good and evil. DERSHOWITZ, supra note
3, at 50.
14 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1, at 653-55 (3d ed. 2000). Most states also
classify killings during the commission of serious felonies as murder. Id. at 653.
" See id. § 7.7, at 692-96; see also United States v. Chagra, 638 F. Supp. 1389, 1399 (W.D.
Tex. 1986) (defining deliberation as requiring "a cool mind that is capable of reflection" and
premeditation as requiring reflection "at least for a short period of time" before the killing),
aff'd, 807 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1986).
" See LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 7.7, at 693; see, e.g., People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942,
948 (Cal. 1968) (observing that "the legislative classification of murder into two degrees would
be meaningless if 'deliberation' and 'premeditation' were construed as requiring no more
reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill"); accord State
v. Solomon, 421 N.E.2d 139 (Ohio 1981); but see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carrol, 194 A.2d
911, 916 (Pa. 1963) (quoting an earlier case that" 'no time is too short for a wicked man to
frame in his mind the scheme of murder' "); Young v. State, 428 So. 2d 155, 158 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982) (noting that "[p]remeditation and deliberation may be formed while the killer is
'pressing the trigger that fired the fatal shot.' ") (citation omitted).
" See LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 7.7, at 692-96.
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of the Cain saga the jury finds to be credible, there is a basis for a finding of
either first or second degree murder. 8
Under the Model Penal Code, on the other hand, murder requires proof of
either purpose or knowledge, 9 or a very high degree of recklessness,
"manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."20 Under the
Code, there are no degrees of homicide.2' Diminished culpability is evaluated
through the extreme emotional disturbance doctrine, proof of which reduces
murder to manslaughter.'
Turning from murder to manslaughter, the common law states define the
latter as an intentional killing "without malice aforethought,"'23 in the heat of
passion.2" The requisite provocation must be reasonable or adequate and is
usually very strictly defined, e.g., being assaulted or seeing a spouse in
flagrante, and not having time to cool off. It is judged by an objective
standard.' Some common law states have more expansive defimitions of
provocation,26 but even in these states it is often difficult to get to the jury on
" See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
"See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.2(1), 120 (1985), stating that "criminal homicide
constitutes murder when: (a)it is committed purposely or knowingly." In § 2.02(2Xa), the Code
defines "purposely" as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such
a result; ....
In turn,
[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct,
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.
Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
20 Id. at § 210.2(I)(b), at 120.
21 See id. Explanatory Note for Criminal Homicide, at 117, 118.
n See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
2' LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 7.9, at 703.
24 See id. § 7.10, at 703-17.
"' See Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718,722 (Md. 1991) (reaffirming common law rule that
words alone are insufficient for amanslaughter instruction); State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272,278
(Ohio 1992) (same).
26 See Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d 262,264-65 (Pa. 1975) (permitting manslaughter
instruction if any circumstances, including words, would provoke a reasonable person to lose
self-control); Maher v. People, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (Mich. 1862) (holding that what constitutes
reasonable provocation is usually a matter for the jury rather than the court).
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the issue." Furthermore, some jurisdictions require the victim rather than a
third party to be the provoker.2' Thus if one views God rather than Abel as the
provocateur, 9 in such jurisdictions Cain might be convicted of murder even
if he acted in the heat of passion.
To establish manslaughter under the Model Penal Code, the defendant must
have acted recklessly 0 or "under extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse."'" The test is more
subjective than the common law counterpart of heat of passion; unlike the
latter, there is noper se requirement that the provocation be legally adequate,
although there are objective elements to it. Thus, the "reasonableness" of the
"explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. 32 As
a result, Code jurisdictions make it far easier to secure jury consideration of
manslaughter. There need not even be real external provocation; rather, it can
stem, from the defendant's psyche. For example, in one case, the wrongdoer
was afraid of his brother and killed him, even though there was no basis in fact
for his fear.33 Accordingly, the Model Penal Code would give Cain a realistic
27 See Stahl v. State, 712 S.W.2d 783, 788-89 (Tex. App. 1986) (finding a ten-minute lapse
of time between killing and provoking act adequate cooling time as a matter of law).
28 See Lopez v. State, 716 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (upholding murder
conviction of defendant who in a rage killed a third party, based on penal code provision stating
that" '[s]udden passion' "means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by
the individual killed." TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(2) (West 2000).
29 See infra note 114 and accompanying text exploring God's possible role as provocateur.
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.3(1), at 120 (1985). The recklessness required for
manslaughter is less egregious than that mandated for murder, which necessitates proof of
"extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id. § 210.2(1)(b) In § 2.02(2Xc), the Code
defines "recklessly" in these terms:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation.
3' Id. § 210.3(1)(b).
32 Id. The drafters' comments make clear that there is a wholly subjective requirement
regarding whether the defendant did in fact act under extreme emotional disturbance, whereas
the "reasonableness" requirement is objective. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part
II, § 210.3, at 49-50 (1980).
'3 See State v. Elliot, 411 A.2d 3 (Conn. 1979).
There is a split of opinion on the underlying rationale for provocation, that is, whether it
is a quasi-justification or a quasi-excuse, and the alternative one chooses can alter the result. For
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possibility of getting to the jury on a manslaughter charge. It is not, however,
a slam dunk. Even in Code states, courts will sometimes refuse manslaughter
instructions, finding the provocation to be inadequate. 4 In addition, even if
Cain received jury consideration for manslaughter, there is no guarantee that
the jurors would accept his mitigation claim.
Taking this millennium-hopping comparison a few steps backward, we
learn that the Jewish law of homicide affords an interesting contrast, as well
as an uncertain result, in the case of Cain. To be guilty of murder in the
rabbinic courts, one must kill intentionally and with premeditation. For
example, according to Exodus 21:14, one who "act[s] intentionally against his
fellow to kill him with guile" is guilty of a capital crime," whose punishment
example, if provocation is considered a semi-justification, some states take the position that if
the killer accidentally slays someone other than the provoker, there is no defense. E.g., Lopez
v. State, 716 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If semi-excuse is the rationale, one focuses
on the defendant's state of mind rather than the culpability of the victim. In the latter
circumstances, the killer cannot be deterred, and his rage is more understandable. See Joshua
Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 456-58 (1982) (arguing that the justification rationale is in tension with
society's belief in the value of human life).
3 See People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1984) (affirming trial court's refusal
of manslaughter instruction in case of defendant who shot his drug dealer for refusing to sell him
more drugs), aff'd, 475 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Mejia, 561 N.Y.S.2d 265 (App. Div.
1990) (refusing manslaughter instruction for defendant who shot victim without giving him an
opportunity to retreat, even though the deceased had menaced the defendant with a screwdriver,
albeit from a distance).
" Jewish law, however, contains an array of procedural, substantive and evidentiary
safeguards that render conviction exceedingly difficult. See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg &
Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic RuleAgainst Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 955 (1988) (discussing the absolute prohibition against use of confessions in criminal
cases); Irene Merker Rosenberg et al., Murder by Gruma: Causation in Homicide Cases Under
Jewish Law, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1017 (2000) [hereinafter Causation in Homicide Cases Under
Jewish Law] (analyzing the hyperstringent talmudic causation requirements); Irene Merker
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, "Perhaps What Ye Say is Based Only on Conjec-
ture "-Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1371 (1995) (explaining the
absolute prohibition against the use of circumstantial evidence). Indeed, one such procedural
safeguard is that the witnesses must warn the suspect that the conduct in question is prohibited
and punished by death, THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 80b (I. Epstein ed., 1960)
[hereinafter B. TALMUD], a notice requirement designed to deter the defendant, but which, in a
homicide case, establishes the wrongdoer's premeditation if it fails to accomplish the desired
objective.
Not all of these barriers, however, apply to non-Jews. Cain was not Jewish-the first Jew
was Abraham-and, in any event, the Torah had not yet been given to man. Even the Noachide
laws, which are applicable to all human beings and which include a prohibition against murder,
B. TALMUD, supra, Sanhedrin 56a-56b, may not have been imposed in Cain's era. See 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDICA 362 (Shlomo J. Zevin ed., 1992) (noting disagreement among
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is death by beheading.' On the other hand, Exodus 21:13 states that one who
kills but who "ha[s] not lain in ambush" for his victim is subject only to
banishment in a city of refuge. This exile, which echoes Cain's sentence,
saves the wrongdoer from the blood avenger, 37 and living with the priestly
Levites in a city of refuge permits him to contemplate his sin and refine his
character.38 Similarly, in Numbers 35:20-23, the verses suggest that one is
guilty of murder only if he lies in wait, that is, in "ambush."39 If, however, he
kills another "with suddenness, without enmity,"' ° he is not culpable for
murder and is instead consigned to a city of refuge.4' The barebones Genesis
account does not provide sufficient information to establish whether Cain lay
in wait and was consequently a murderer, or whether the killing was even
intentional.' 2
Be that as it may, safety from the blood avenger in a city of refuge is
available only to one who is guilty of an "inadvertent" killing,43 which is
roughly a synonym for negligent homicide." There is also a category of
talmudic sages "regarding the number of precepts given to Adam. All agree, however, that after
the Flood Noah's descendants were commanded all seven precepts"). Presumably, however, the
prohibition against murder was one of the laws given to Adam. Indeed, it is a malum in se
offense, and ignorance of the law is not a defence in such circumstances. DERSHOWITz, supra
note 3, at 53. There is, however, a Midrash stating that God mitigated Cain's punishment on
notice grounds, i.e., no one had told him of the seriousness of his crime. See infra notes 146,
156 and accompanying texts; but see OTZER HA-MIDRASHIM, Leviticus 5: 1, at 222 (Eisenstein
ed. undated) (asserting that Cain loved possessions and did not study Torah, whereas Abel did
study and that the sign placed on Cain after the killing was either boils or leprosy, as a penalty
for his failure to learn Torah; the underlying assumption appears to be that long before Sinai
some form of the Torah was available, and there was an obligation to learn it).
16 See THE MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 9:1, at 395 (Herbert Danby trans., 1933) [hereinafter
MISHNAH], reprinted in B. TALMUD, supra note 35, Sanhedrin 76b.
" See Numbers 35:19, 22-28; Deuteronomy 4:41-43, 19:2-10.
31 See THE PENTATEUCH-THE HIRSCH COMMENTARY, Numbers 35:34, at 647 (Ephraim
Oratz ed. & Gertrude Hirschler trans., 1986) [hereinafter HIRSCH COMMENTARYONTHE TORAH].
39 See Numbers 35:20.
40 Id. at 35:22.
41 See id. at 35:22-28; Deuteronomy 4:41-43, 19:2-10.
42 See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (giving various and conflicting accounts
of the killing).
41 See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Book II: TheBookof Torts, Murder and the Preservation
ofLife 5:1, at 209 (Hyman Klein trans., 1954) [hereinafter THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES] (noting
that "[i]f one slays inadvertently, he must go into exile from the district where he has slain to a
city of refuge').
44 See ARTSCROLL SERIES, TALMUD BAVLI, Makkos, Introduction to ch. 2, p. 1 (Hersh
Goldwurm & Nosson Scherman eds., 1990) [hereinafter ARTSCROLL TALMUD] (defining
"inadvertent killing" as one "which results from some measure of negligence, but not gross
negligence. This is the type of unintentional killing for which the Torah decrees.., exile").
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killings known as "close to intentional," describing a reckless or perhaps even
grossly negligent homicide or an intentional slaying without premeditation.43
Such killings are not punished in the human courts but are left either to the
blood avenger or to God, being too serious for exile to a city of refuge, but not
quite evil enough for infliction of capital punishment by the human court."
Cain's act might fit within this category as well, depending on the manner in
which he killed Abel.47
The net effect is that, under either American or Jewish law, determining
whether Cain might be guilty of something less than intentional, premeditated
murder will turn on a careful examination of the "facts" of the case. At this
point, however, it must be conceded that the evidence is fairly stale. How,
then, do we ascertain the facts?
From a Jewish perspective, assessing the Cain-Abel conflict and ascertain-
ing Cain's level of culpability involve more than scrutinizing the skeletal
language of the Torah text and then applying the law to these "facts." In
Judaism, the words of the Torah itself are of course the natural starting point,
but they are merely the beginning of the exegetical process. Understanding
can be achieved only after examination of a far more extensive corpus,
including the Talmud, a redaction of the oral law of Judaism, consisting of the
Mishnah and the Gemara;" the Midrash Aggadah, rabbinic interpretations of
Torah verses that include moral and ethical teachings disguised as stories,
parables, riddles, legends and the like, that often appear contradictory to one
another;49 medieval commentaries by such luminaries as Rashi, the Ramban,
"' Id. (translating the Hebrew phrase as "bordering on the intentional" and defining it as "a
killing which results from gross negligence and an obvious disregard for the safety of the victim.
The Torah ... [considers the crime] too severe to be atoned for by mere exile').
4' See id. For a fuller exposition of these gradations of homicide and the allocation of
jurisdiction to human and heavenly tribunals, see Arnold N. Enker, Error Juris in Jewish
Criminal Law, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 23, 27-33 (1994-95); Causation in Homicide Cases Under
Jewish Law, supra note 35, at 1023-30.
47 See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text discussing God's imposition of the
banishment sanction.
48 For a comprehensive exposition and analysis of the Talmud, see ADN STEINSALTZ, THE
TALMUD, THE STEINsALTz EDITION: A REFERENCE GUIDEpasim (Israel Berman trans., 1989).
Its constituent parts, the Mishnah and the Gemara, were redacted around 200 C.E. and 500 C.E.
respectively.
49 See, e.g., MOSHE WEIssMAN, Foreword to I THE MIDRASH SAYS vii-xiii (Moshe
Weissman ed., 1980) (explaining the nature of the Midrash Aggadah); JAMEs L. KUGEL,
Foreword, in I Louis GINZBERG, THE LEGENDS OF THE JEWS xv (1998) (observing that "the
(mostly anonymous) creators of midrash, who began to flourish as early as the third or fourth
centuries B.C.E., did not seek to explain the Bible in an objective, dispassionate way. They
were, on the contrary, engage[d] interpreters who sought everywhere to bring out what they
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the Sforno, Ibn Ezra, and the Malbim; and modern commentaries by
authorities such as Hirsch, Nachshoni, and Leibowitz. ° The first step,
however, is to scrutinize the Torah narrative itself.
Im. THE NOT SO PLAIN MEANING
OF THE TORAH TEXT
Starting with the verses in Genesis themselves, initially the key word in the
biblical narrative seems to be the verb describing Cain's sin of taking his
brother's life. The Hebrew word used in the original text is a form of the root
"harag," whose translation is generally "kill."'" The Hebrew root for murder,
on the other hand, is usually "ratsach,' 5 2 the act prohibited and the term used
in the Decalogue. s By using the verb "harag" in this context, is the Bible
suggesting that Cain did not commit an intentional premeditated murder, as
most people seem to think, but is guilty only of some lesser form of homicide?
As it turns out, relying on the "harag-ratsach" distinction is not that helpful
in determining the degree of homicide committed by Cain. Although "ratsach"
believed to be the eternal, relevant, and fundamentally religious significance of the biblical
text.").
so It should be noted that, although the Talmud, Midrash Aggadah, and medieval and
modem commentaries are discrete categories, the midrashic literature is incorporated throughout
the Talmud, and it is likewise cited, quoted and relied on by the commentators.
51 See MARCUS JASTROW, A DICTIONARY OF THE TARGUMIM, THE TALMUD BABLI AND
YERUSHALMI, AND THE MDRASiC LITERATURE 365 (1985) (translating "harag" as "to kill, put
to death"); REUBEN AVINOAM, COMPENDIOUS HEBREW-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 91 (M.H. Segal
rev. ed. 1938) (giving modem Hebrew translation as "to kill, slay"); but see MATITYAHU CLARK,
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF BIBLICAL HEBREW 61 (1999) (translating "harag" as "kill,
murder").
52 See JASTROw, supra note 51, at 1493 (translating "ratsach" as "to slay, murder");
AVINOAM, supra note 51, at 359 (giving the translation as "to murder, slay, kill"); CLARK, supra
note 51, at 248 (translating "rasach" solely as "murder").
" See Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. Even Jewish translations differ in their
interpretation of the Hebrew word used, "tirtsach," which comes from the root "ratsach." See,
e.g.,THE CHUMASH, supra note 4, Exodus 20:13, at 411, Deuteronomy 5:17, at 971 (using "kill,"
but referring repeatedly to murder in the footnote commentary, id. at 411); THE PENTATEUCH
AND HAFTORAHS, Exodus 20:13, at 299, Deuteronomy 5:17, at 767 (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1989)
("murder"); THE JERUSALEM BIBLE, Exodus 20:13, at 86, Deuteronomy 5:17, at 217 (Harold
Fisch ed., 1989) ("murder"); THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY, Exodus 20:13, at 554,
Deuteronomy 5:17, at 1357 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981) ("murder"). For non-Jewish
translations, see, e.g., A READER'S GUIDE TO THE HOLY BIBLE-KING JAMES VERSION, Exodus
20:13, at 89, Deuteronomy 5:17, at 222 (1972) ("kill"); NEW AMERICAN STANDARD BIBLE,
Exodus 20:13, at 110, Deuteronomy 5:17, at 267 (1960) ("murder").
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means murder when used in the noun form,54 when used as a verb, both
Hebrew terms, "harag" and "ratsach" can denote either killing or murder."
For instance, in Exodus 21:14, the Torah uses a form of the verb "harag" in
describing the punishment inflicted on one who "act[s] intentionally against
his fellow to kill him with guile," a clear instance of intentional, premeditated
murder.56 Conversely, in Deuteronomy 4:42, Scripture employs "ratsach" to
denote a form of negligent homicide. 7
Since the key verb describing the slaying turns out to be inconclusive in
ascertaining the moral level of Cain's crime, perhaps the threshold question
should be, "What's in a name?" The names "Cain" and "Abel" may provide
a clue to their respective characters. Indeed, it is often the case in Scripture
that names disclose significant information about the person.58
The root of Cain is "kinyan"-acquire. Abel is derived from the word for
vanity--"hevel. 59 One can view these meanings in various ways, one of
which is that Cain wanted to acquire material possessions, and Abel sought
4 See JASTROW, supra note 51, at 1493 (defining the noun form as "murderer, assassin").
s See THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY, supra note 53, at 1357 (observing that
while in English there is a distinction between 'kill' (which may be autho-
rized by the state or be accidental) and 'murder' (which is unauthorized and
malicious), the Hebrew 'ratsach' cannot be clearly distinguished from the
more frequent 'harag.' However, the commandment deals obviously with
homicide, and hints those supporting pacifism or the abolition of capital
punishment cannot justifiably base themselves on this word but must look to
other reasons.).
(footnote omitted)
S6 See discussion at supra note 35 and accompanying text.
57 Deuteronomy 4:42 refers to one who "killed his fellow without knowledge, but was not
an enemy of his from yesterday and before yesterday." See COMMENTARY OF THE RASHBAM,
I Mikraot Gedolot Ha-Maor, Exodus 20:13, at 468 (Aaron Samet & Daniel Biton eds., 1990)
(contending that "ratsach" is used in Deuteronomy 4:42 merely for stylistic reasons).
s8 For example, Rashi states that Cain's descendant, Tubal-Cain, who, according to one set
of Midrashim, was responsible for Cain's death (see infra note.1 65 and accompanying text), was
so named, because "he improved the work of Cain. 'Tubal' is an expression based on 'tavleen'
(spices). He seasoned and improved the work of Cain in making implements of war for
murderers." 1 THE PENTATEUCH AND RAsHI'S COMMENTARY, Genesis 4:22, at 45 (Abraham
Ben Isaiah & Benjamin Sharfman trans., 1949) [hereinafter THE PENTATEUCH AND RASh'S
COMMENTARY].
59 See RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:1, at 87:
Now she [Eve] called one son by a name indicating 'acquisition,' and the
second one she called Abel, denoting 'vanity' because man's acquisition is
likened to vanity. But she did not wish to say so explicitly. Therefore, no
reason is written for the name of the second son. The secret received by




prestige, a form of vanity." In this view, neither brother is an apostle of
virtue. In fact, one modem commentator argues that Adam's children
symbolize "the twisted path of corrupting the essence of creation," ' 1 and their
names show it. Cain loves material possessions, and Abel, who is at an
arguably somewhat higher level, disdains work because it is vain. Thus,
Cain's acquisitive nature may afford a basis for inferring a motive for
premeditated murder, namely, a desire to take his brother's share of the
wealth.62 On the other hand, the symbolism of Cain's name may be benign and
in fact praiseworthy, for Eve declares that she "acquired a man (Cain) with
God, 63 which Rashi, the famed eleventh century French exegesist, interprets
to mean with God's help, viewing God as a partner in the process of procre-
ation.'
The biblical text provides other subtle clues concerning the nature of the
brothers' characters, which may in turn bear on Cain's level of culpability.
Consider their respective professions. Cain chose to be a tiller of the soil, and
Abel became a shepherd." The Sforno, a sixteenth century Italian exegesist
and physician, says that the latter was a more skilled occupation than the
former, arguably borne out by the emergence of leaders of the Jewish people
from the ranks of shepherds, to wit, Jacob, Moses, and David.66 Moreover,
shepherding allows one to contemplate spiritual matters and build the
60 See YEHUDA NACHSHONI, STUDIES IN THE WEEKLY PARASHAH--BEREISHIS 17 (Shmuel
Himelstein trans., 1988). See also 1 Louis GINZBERG, THE LEGENDS OF THE JEWS 107
(Henrietta Szold trans., 1909) (noting that "Eve bore her second son, whom she named Hebel,
because, she said, he was born but to die."). Another Midrash tells of Eve's dream in which she
"... had seen the blood of Abel flow into the mouth of Cain, who drank it with avidity, though
his brother entreated him not to take all." Id.
61 NACHSHONI, supra note 60, at 17.
62 See 8 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Ecclesiastes 6:3, at 159 (asserting that Cain, ...
was not satisfied with [what he possessed of] the world's good things"); PIRKEI D'RABBI
ELIEZER, ch. 23, at 70 (M.H. Horwitz ed., 1973) (accusing Cain of murdering his brother in
order to take possession of his property).
' Genesis 4:1. According to one Midrash, however, Cain is the evil offspring of Eve and
the serpent. 1 GINZBERG, supra note 60, at 105.
64 See THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHi'S COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4: 1, at 37.
Rashi favors the plain meaning of biblical passages throughout his exegesis of the Torah. See,
e.g., id., Genesis 3:24, at 37. He gives aggadic interpretations as well when he feels that they
are necessary for a fuller understanding of the text. See, e.g., id., Genesis 1: 1, at 1.
6s See Genesis 4:2.
66 See I SFORNO, COMMENTARYONTHETORAH, Genesis 4:2, at 34 (Raphael Pelcovitz trans.,
1987). See EICHHORN, supra note 5, at 36 (referring to Moses and David as exemplars and
asserting that "Abel displayed wisdom and strength of character when he decided to become a
shepherd rather than a farmer").
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character of mercy, because shepherds are isolated and must care for and
nurture living creatures.67 This is supported by the text, which mentions
Cain's occupation after his brother's, even though Cain is the elder." On the
other hand, the Malbim, a nineteenth century Russian exegesist, argues that
farming was the preferred occupation reserved for the first born, whereas
shepherds were viewed with disfavor, so it was perfectly respectable for Cain
to engage in agriculture.69
It is also possible, however, that Abel actually wanted to become a
shepherd rather than a farmer because God had cursed the earth after Adam
and Eve had sinned. 70 Following this line of reasoning, Cain nonetheless opted
for farming perhaps because he was stubborn or because he believed the curse
against the earth applied only to his father, Adam. One difficulty with fanning
is that it requires hard work, leaving little time for spiritual matters.7' Cain
may also have become obsessed with tilling the land and deluded himself that
his wealth came from his own efforts rather than God's will.72  Such an
interpretation fits with God's punishment that Cain would no longer be able
to farm successfully and indeed that he would become a wanderer on the
earth,73 rendering him entirely unable to farm.74 In this view, Cain's character,
usually irrelevant in assessing criminal liability,75 was not of the highest order.
He was arrogant and spiritually blunted, devoting himself to physical labor for
67 See SFORNO, supra note 66, Genesis 4:2, at 34; cf MEYERSIMCHA, MESHECHCHACHMAH
5 (Abraham Abraham ed., 1972) (asserting animals were preferred sacrifices because of the
effort required in raising them).
68 See SFORNO, supra note 66, Genesis 4:2, at 34.
69 See I MALBIM COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, Genesis 4:2, at 299-300 (Zvi Faier trans.,
1982).
70 See THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHJ'S COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 1:11, at 7-8
(noting that during Creation God had commanded the earth to put forth "fruit tree bearing fruit,"
but the earth merely produced "tree bearing fruit." According to Rashi, God's command was
intended to make the trees themselves taste like fruit. Therefore, "when Adam was cursed
because of his sin, it [the earth] too was remembered [punished] because of its sin and was
cursed.").
71 See HIRSCHCOMMENTARYONTHETORAH, supra note 38, Genesis 4:2, at 22 ("Agriculture
calls primarily for the use of all man's physical energies.... The tiller of the ground is dragged
down more and more to the level of the soil he cultivates.").
72 See id.
73 See 9 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Esther 6:3, at 74 (asserting that the biblical
statement that Cain was a tiller of the earth implied "... that he was predestined for
banishment.").
74 See Genesis 4:12; see also I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:10, at 190
(discussing various interpretations of God's curse with respect to farming).




material gain. For whatever reason, a Midrash concludes that Cain was one
of "[t]hree [who] had a passion for agriculture, and no good was found in
them." 76
Proceeding to the details of the plot line, even a cursory inspection of the
Torah text reveals that it is laden with ambiguity. For example, one is struck
by the phrase, "Cain rose up against his brother Abel. 77 Since he "rose up,"
does this mean that Cain was literally (or figuratively) underneath Abel, and,
if so, why was Cain down? Was he crouching down in the field, lying in wait?
Or lying prostrate, because Abel had knocked him down? Or lying placidly
asleep? Or is the language simply metaphorical? The text does not explain.
The oral law, however, suggests that Abel, who was the stronger of the two,
pinned Cain down during a quarrel,7" whereupon Cain pleaded with his brother
to let him go, arguing that if Abel killed him, Adam and Eve would be
distressed and would know who the killer was,79 there being no other humans
in the world."0 Consequently, Abel, in pity, released Cain,"' who then "rose
up" against his brother.8 2 Such a scenario of assault could support either
manslaughter or murder: on the one hand, Cain's play on Abel's sympathy,
together with the subsequent killing, may indicate premeditation. Alterna-
tively, however, although this is not the sense of the Midrash, assuming Cain
76 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 36:3, at 289. The other two agricultural
miscreants specified in the Midrash were Noah and Uzziah.
" Genesis 4:8.
The Torah itself makes no explicit reference to a quarrel, stating only that Cain "spoke"
with Abel, after which they were in a field, and Cain "rose up" and killed his brother. Genesis
4:8. A number of Midrashim, however, assume that a quarrel preceded the slaying. See, e.g.,
3 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Exodus 30:17, at 366 (footnote omitted) ("Nothing good or
peaceful ever results from strife. It was only after a quarrel that Cain smote his brother.").
79 See 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:8, at 187.
so The midrashic literature, however, states that Eve gave birth to a girl together with Cain
and to either one or two girls at the time of Abel's birth. I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1,
Genesis 22:2, at 180; id. 22:3 & n.5, at 181; id. 22:7, at 187; 2 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note
1, Genesis 61:4, at 543. See also B. TALMUD, supra note 35, Yebamoth 62a (discussing the duty
to propagate and relying on an extra word in the Genesis text to denote that each brother was
born together with a sister); id., Sanhedrin 58b (suggesting that Adam did not marry his
daughter so that Cain would be able to do so). According to another Midrash, the brothers were
allowed to marry their sisters notwithstanding the prohibition against incest, Leviticus 18:9,
because of the need to populate the world. PntKEi D'RABBI ELIEZER, supra note 62, at 69.
" See MIDRASH ZUTA, Shir HaShirim 7:10 (Buber ed. undated) (describing God's warning
to Abel not to have compassion on Cain, "this evil one," meaning that he should kill Cain; but,
continues the Midrash, Abel rejected the divine advice).
82 See I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:8, at 187. According to another
Midrash, God admonishes Cain for killing his brother even though Abel had compassion on
Cain when the latter was beneath him. 1 MIDRASH TANCHUMA, supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 18.
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considered the release only a temporary respite from his brother's wrath, the
killing even may be viewed as an instance of justifiable self-defense if Cain
was not the aggressor--or at least imperfect self-defense, which permits one
who is an aggressor and therefore cannot claim perfect self-defense to be
found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder."3
Also fraught with ambiguity is the phrase, "and it happened in the field."'
"Happened" could suggest a sudden encounter without premeditation or
planning. Or it could mean simply that the event took place in the field.
While the Torah states that Cain initiated a conversation with Abel, it does not
even specify whether the brothers actually argued,"5 although, if contemporary
case law involving fratricide affords any guidance, these are usually not
carefully conceived, cold blooded, dispassionate murders, and the sentences
imposed often reflect that reality. 6 Assuming, as is likely, that the brothers
83 See LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 7.11 (a), at 718. Under the Model Penal Code, imperfect
self-defense is viewed as a problem of reckless manslaughter or negligent homicide, depending
on whether the actor's belief was reckless or negligent. MODEL PENAL CODE, cmt. to § 210.3,
at 51 (1985).
" Genesis 4:8. Others translate the verb as "came to pass" (e.g., THE PENTATEUCH AND
HAFrORAHS, supra note 53, Genesis 4:8, at 14), although the Hebrew verb literally means
"was".
8s See Genesis 4:8 ("Cain spoke with his brother Abel"); cf. MIDRASH ZUTA, supra note 81,
Shir HaShirim 7 (labeling Cain a man of "evil speech").
86 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219,222-23 (Pa. 1999) (affirming murder
convictions, as well as death sentence for slaying of sister-in-law and life imprisonment for
killing of brother, with whom defendant had recently fought over transaction involving model
trains; court noted that the brother's "... . body was found surrounded by scattered boxes of
model trains"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000); Miller v. State, 939 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex.
App. 1996) (noting, ".. .dysfunctional family relationships which culminated in... fratricide,"
in which defendant killed his brother because victim turned off television and told him to leave
the house; defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment); Commonwealth v. Jones, 640 A.2d
914, 915 (Pa. Super. 1994) (upholding sentence of 18-60 months for voluntary manslaughter,
where defendant stabbed his half-brother "during the course of a heated argument"; jury
acquitted defendant on murder charge); State v. Gonsalves, 553 A.2d 1073, 1074 (R.I. 1989)
(stating that defendant was convicted of manslaughter for killing his brother, and that they were
"... embroiled in a bitter argument"); Gilchrist v. State, 409 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ark. 1966)
(affirming murder two conviction and 21-year sentence, based on slaying committed after a
"'ruckus' "between defendant and his brother; original charge was murder in the first degree);
State v. Parker, 403 S.W.2d 623,624 (Mo. 1966) (upholding manslaughter conviction and ten-
year sentence for fratricide in the course of an argument; defendant originally charged with
murder two); Hackman v. State, 148 So. 2d 253, 254 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962) (affirming murder
two conviction for fratricide on an indictment for murder in the first degree); State v. Ward, 86
S.E.2d 275 (N.C. 1955) (reversing conviction on other grounds, in a case involving slaying of
brother during a fight, where defendant was originally charged with murder in the second
degree); Jureczki v. State, 211 S.W.2d 231,232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) (upholding conviction
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did argue, it is likewise unclear whether Cain argued with Abel only
immediately preceding the killing, or whether there had been harsh words
previously. In other words, was there time for cooling off, making the heat of
passion defense problematic, at least in the strict common law jurisdictions? 7
Additionally, of what significance is it that the killing occurred in the field,
which was in Cain's dominion? Did Abel enter there on his own, or did Cain
lure him to this locale so that he could kill his brother in the absence of
witnesses?8 Did Cain bare his heart to his brother, "sharing his deep hurt"
with him, as the Sforno suggests,89 or did he pick a fight with Abel, as Rashi
says, in order to have an excuse to kill his sibling," or did the argument
suddenly flare up? What did they argue about?
In short, one may scrutinize the Torah's Cain-and-Abel saga long and hard
without arriving at any firm conclusion concerning the degree of Cain's
blameworthiness. Perhaps the answer lies in an analysis of the talmudic,
medieval and modem commentators, whose contributions we now consider.
of murder without malice and five-year sentence, where defendant killed his brother during the
course of a fight).
See also Dressier, supra note 33, at 421 n.4 (suggesting that, since Cain and Abel were
apparently embroiled in a familial dispute in which jealousy may have been a factor, the killing
might be considered manslaughter, committed in the heat of passion or as a result of extreme
emotional disturbance).
"7 See, e.g., State v. Copling, 741 A.2d 624 (N.J. App. Div. 1999) (ruling that 2 1/2 hour
delay between provoking incident and killing was sufficient cooling off period, and that
consequently no manslaughter instruction was required); State v. Follin, 947 P.2d 8 (Kan. 1997)
(finding that 1 1/2 hour delay was enough cooling time and justified trial court's refusal to give
manslaughter instruction); State v. Robinson, 185 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1945) (affirming murder
conviction, and holding that combination of 30-40 minute interim between fight and killing, and
defendant's cool demeanor, was sufficient basis to deny manslaughter instruction); but see
People v. Brooks, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal. App. 1986) (reversing murder conviction for failure
to instruct jury on manslaughter even though 2 hours had elapsed, relying on earlier decision
ruling that even with 20 hour lapse defendant had acted in heat of passion).
' See Deuteronomy 22:23-27 (distinguishing cases of rape in the field and in the city. If the
rape occurred in the city, where there were people who could hear if the victim, a betrothed
woman, called for help, both the man and the woman are culpable, whereas, in the case of a rape
in the field, the woman is excused, because it is assumed that she called for help, and there was
no one to hear her). See also, SFORNO, supra note 66, Genesis 4:8, at 36 n.8 (stating that
although Cain was prepared to "harm" Abel, he was not ... so callous and cruel as to do so in
the presence of his parents!').
89 SFORNO, supra note 66, Genesis 4:8, at 36 n.8.
90 THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI's COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:8, at 39.
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IV. THE TORAH TEXT AS SEEN BY THE MIDRASH
AND THE COMMENTATORS 9'
Somewhat surprisingly, and perhaps stemming from the ambiguities of the
Genesis account, a number of the commentaries give explanations of the
argument that are independent of the sacrifice episode that figures centrally in
the scriptural text. A midrashic source asserts that Cain and Abel were
archetypes rather than mere individuals, and that they were arguing about that
which people usually fight, namely, land (wealth), religion, and sex.92
The Midrash gives three explanations of these universal bones of
contention that lead to bloodshed. The first is that Cain and Abel decided to
divide the world.93 Cain took the land, and Abel, the personalty. Cain said,
"The land you stand on is mine," directing Abel to "fly [off the ground]," and
his brother responded, "What you are wearing is mine," ordering Cain to take
his apparel off." In the course of the fight that ensued, Cain killed Abel. The
second version is that the brothers divided the land and the personalty, but
each one wanted the future Temple to be built on his share.95 Finally, one sage
opined that the brothers were fighting about sexual access to their mother Eve.
Alternatively, the sexual quarrel concerned one of the twin sisters born along
9' Attesting to the view of law as a "seamless web," I FREDERICKPOLLOCK& FREDERICW.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW I (2d ed. 1909), the previous section of this Article
examining the ambiguities of the Torah text, necessarily refers to the positions of some of the
authorities cited and discussed in this section, which deals more directly with the Midrash and
the biblical commentaries. The short of the matter is that it is a central tenet of Jewish law and
learning that the written Torah cannot be understood in a vacuum. Cf. THE MISHNAH, 2(a) Seder
Nezikin, Sanhedrin, front cover flap (ArtScroll Mishnah Series, Matis Roberts trans., 1987)
("When Moses descended from Sinai, he held the Tablets in his hands and the Oral Law in his
mind. The words of the Law would be contained in the Written Torah, but their meaning and
application would be transmitted from teacher to student in an eternal chain of generations.");
Michael Wyschogrod, Was the OralLaw Given at Sinai?, MOMENT MAGAZINE, 12 (April 1991)
("It might even be argued that the oral law is more central to Judaism than the written.
Christianity, after all, also reveres the Bible as the word of God. What it does not do is accept
the oral Torah.').
92 See NEHAMA LEIBOWITZ, STUDIES IN BERESHIT (Genesis) 39 (4th rev. ed. undated)
(categorizing the midrashic explanations of the brothers' quarrel in this manner).
" See I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:7, at 187. The Midrash does not
specify which brother initiated the plan.
" Id. In a variant Midrash concerning the property, Cain tries to take credit for Abel's
sacrifice, arguing that, since he was the eldest, he should receive a double portion, and that
portion should include the land on which Abel offered his sacrifice. I MIDRASH TANCHUMA,
supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 17.
95 See I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:7, at 187.
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with Abel.96 The interests of these midrashic commentators transcend the
particular individuals involved; instead, they are seeking to ascertain a
universal truth and are thus unhampered by the literal text.97
In a variant Midrash dealing with the brothers' division of the world, Cain's
blameworthiness is highlighted, and he is given a motive that accords with
premeditated murder, namely, that he "was impatient to possess the whole
world." 98 Furthermore, the Midrash says that after dividing the property,
"Cain thought of a plan to remove Abel from this world."" Cain then ran after
his brother, shouting," 'Get away from my property,' until he finally rose up
against him and slew him."'" This Midrash concludes by referring to Cain,
"whose eye was so evil against his brother."' '°
The biblical text itself, however, says nothing of a division of the world,
suggesting instead that the cause of the dispute was God's evaluation of the
brothers' respective offerings."0 2 Abel gave of "the firstlings of his flock and
from their choicest," whereas Cain gave only "the fruit of the ground."' 3 God
accepted Abel's sacrifice for two reasons: it was the best of the flock,"° and
' See id. Another Midrash adds that Cain was jealous of Abel and hated him because, inter
alia, the latter's sister was more beautiful than his, and Cain desired her. PIRKEI D'RABBI
ELIEZER, supra note 62, ch. 23, at 70; see also supra note 80 (dealing with the two brothers'
female siblings).
9' See LEIBowITZ, supra note 92, at 39.
98 3 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Exodus 31:17, at 399; see also EICHHORN, supra note
5, at 62.
99 3 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Exodus 31:17, at 399.
10 Id.
'I' Id. at 399-400.
"2 At the same time, the midrashic explanation concerning the brothers' division ofthe world
is consistent with the biblical account of their respective sacrifices, for "Cain brought of the
fruits of the ground-his immovable property, and Abel brought the firstborn of his sheep-his
movable property." Id. at 399 n.4.
Cf 4 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Leviticus 27:5, at 348 (discussing the assertion that
God "demands satisfaction for the blood of the pursued at the hands ofthe pursuers," and giving
as proof thereof that, "Abel in fact was pursued by Cain," and therefore God chose Abel's
offering). See also 8 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Ecclesiastes 3:15, at 99.
103 Genesis 4:3. See THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI's COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis
4:3, at 38 (stating that Cain's sacrifice was "from the inferior" fruit and that.. . "there is an
Aggadah which says that it was flax seed."). See also I MIDRASH TANCHUMA, supra note 1,
Breishis 9, at 17 (observing that Cain's sacrifice was leftovers or surplus that he did not need,
consisting of flax seeds); I GINZBERG, supra note 60, at 107 (noting that "Cain ate his meal first,
and after he had satisfied his appetite, he offered unto God what was left over, a few grains of
flax seed.").
'04 See PaiKEi D'RABBi ELIEZER, supra note 62, ch. 23, at 69 (noting Abel's sheep were not
only the fattest of his flock, but also unshorn, meaning that he received no benefit from these
animals, giving them fully to God).
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it came from his flock, whereas Cain brought only "of the fruit of the ground"
rather than choice fruit that he had worked to produce, that is, Cain made no
real sacrifice in the offering he submitted to God. 5 Or, as the Midrash puts
it, Cain brought, "of the inferior crops," and was consequently, "like a bad
tenant who eats the first ripe figs but honours the king with the late figs.""'°
Abel, however, was not responsible for God's action, so why would Cain
direct his wrath toward his brother rather than the real culprit? It is of course
conceivable that Abel gave of his choicest to upstage Cain, the usually favored
elder son. 0 7 Yet given Abel's temporal closeness to the Creation, it is more
likely that he gave a superior sacrifice out of a genuine love of God and
recognition that everything belongs to God, Who deserves thanks for creation.
Moreover, if Abel did have such faith and love, presumably he believed that
God could plumb his secret thoughts and, if his motives were improper, God
would accordingly reject his sacrifice as He did Cain's.
On the other hand, aside from simply being consumed by jealousy, Cain
may have concluded that Abel's sacrifice, which came after his elderbrother's,
was offered to curry favor with the Master of the Universe."° Thus, Cain may
have held Abel responsible for God's rejection of his sacrifice and for God's
rebuke. Had Abel not offered his best sheep, God would not have been able
to distinguish between the two, at least by virtue of their deeds. Cain cannot
'0' See supra note 103 (describing the inferior nature of Cain's sacrifice).
106 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:5, at 182 & n.5 (noting that the early figs
were "a special delicacy").
107 See Deuteronomy 21:15-17 (giving first born son a double portion). See also RAMBAN
COMMENTARY ON THETORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:7, at 88 (interpreting this verse, in which
God advises Cain that if he improves, he will be forgiven, as meaning," 'If you will mend your
ways you will have your rightful superiority in se'eith (dignity) over your brother since you are
the firstborn.' ").
On the other hand, first born sons do not always prevail over younger brothers who are
spiritually superior to them. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4,20 (1983) (giving as examples the stories of Ishmael
and Isaac, Genesis 21:1-14, Esau and Jacob, id., 25:29-34,27:1-40, and Joseph and his brothers,
37:1-47:12). Professor Cover also notes that in the Cain and Abel scenario, their younger
brother, Seth, becomes the "progenitor of the human race." Cover, supra, at 20.
' Cf Isaiah 1:11-17 (expressing God's disdain for insincere sacrifices, and instead urging
the people to "[Ilearn to do good, seek justice, vindicate the victim, render justice to the orphan,
take up the grievance of the widow") (id., 1:17); to the same effect, see id., 58:3-12; 1 Samuel
15:22; Micah 6:6-8.
109 See EIC-HORN, supra note 5, at 41-42 (referring to Cain's comment to Abel that the latter
"went out and got all [his] animals together to make sure that [he] would not be outdone by
[Cain and Adam].'). See also id. at 46 (where Cain perceives Abel's behavior as a ".
deliberate plot to supplant him as God's favorite.").
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tangle with God, but his brother is a different matter. If Cain gets rid of Abel,
God would, according to this perception of Cain's view, have no choice other
than to accept his offering.
When God rejected that offering, Cain became exceedingly angry, "° "and
his countenance fell,"' denoting shame. "2  God then admonished Cain,
asking him why he was reacting in this manner, and telling him that he could
repent and rule over his evil inclination; that is, Cain could exercise his free
will and achieve spiritual elevation." 3 Perhaps this revelation was a shock to
Cain, since he might have believed that, inasmuch as an omniscient and
omnipotent God had created the world and human beings, it was He Who
determined all events.14 Now, however, after God's lecture, Cain understood
that he had a responsibility to improve his character.
Cain nonetheless rejected God's admonition to look at his own motives and
deeds and repent. Instead, his reaction was in the opposite direction-grossly
Io The Hebrew term used is "vayihar," which "is derived from harah, to bum..."; thus, the
biblical verse might mean that Cain was "burnt up, i.e., blackened." 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra
note 1, Genesis 22:6, at 184 n.5. One might also argue that Cain's "blackened" face was a sign
of deep shame, or reflected a combination of shame and anger. Cf Thomas Scheff& Suzanne
Retzinger, Shame, Anger and the Social Bond: A Theory of Sexual Offenders and Treatment, 3
ELECTRONIC J. Soc. 1, 8 (1997) ("propos[ing] a theory of shame/rage loops leading to verbal
or physical violence," and noting that such "[s]hame/anger loops may also be the emotional
basis for institutionalized conflict between individuals and between groups, as in duels, feuds,
vendettas, and wars.").
... Genesis 4:4.
11 See RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note i, Genesis 4:7, at 88 (observing
that "he who is ashamed presses his face downward'). See also Scheff& Retzinger, supra note
110 (discussing the connection between shame and anger).
"' See Genesis 4:7; see also RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis
4:7, at 89:
[Y]our sin longs to cleave to you at all times. Nevertheless thou mayest rule
over it if you so desire, for you may mend your ways and remove it from
upon you. Thus He taught him [Cain] concerning repentance, that it lies
within his power to return anytime he desires and He will forgive him.
"t4 See 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:9, at 189, in which Rabbi Simeon bar
Yohai gives the following parable: "Think of two athletes wrestling before the king; had the
king wished, he could have separated them. But he did not so desire, and one overcame the
other and killed him, . . ." See also id., Genesis 30:8, at 236 (asserting that "Cain was
predestined to exile.").
Indeed, invoking this perspective and quoting the above Midrash, Professor Dershowitz
suggests that God mitigated Cain's punishment because the latter was provoked, not by Abel,
but by the Master of the Universe Himself. See DERSHOWiTZ, supra note 3, at 52 ("If God's
action and inaction provoked Cain into killing Abel, then it becomes understandable why God
would mitigate Cain's punishment. Provocation has traditionally been recognized as a
mitigating consideration, though the victim is generally the provocateur.").
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compounding his original misconduct by taking the life of his brother."5 Thus,
Cain missed the opportunity that God had given man to conquer sin. Just as
Adam and Eve had sinned against God, Cain now sinned against both his
fellow man and God. Indeed, the Torah and the commentaries emphasize the
gravity of that sin. When God tells Cain that the "blood" of his brother called
out to Him from the ground, the Hebrew word for blood ("dom") is pluralized
("dimei"). "" Why? According to the Midrash, the point of the pluralization
is to establish that Cain killed not only Abel, but also his descendants, "the
blood of his posterity."....
The medieval commentaries on this episode give various explanations of
the occurrence. " Rashi opts for murder as the "plain meaning" of the biblical
text, asserting simply that Cain began an argument as a pretext to kill Abel." 9
Yet this explanation does not render Cain completely unsympathetic. If he
were a cold-blooded killer, what need would he have for a prefatory pretextual
argument? Even in this view there is something in Cain's character that
requires him to stir himself up to hot bloodedness before he can kill.
20
The Ramban, a thirteenth century Spanish exegesist, kabalist and poet,
reaches the same ultimate conclusion of murder, albeit by a somewhat more
circuitous path. He opines that the biblical words, "and Cain spoke to Abel his
brother," are connected to "it came to pass, when they were in the field," and
on that basis he concludes that Cain invited Abel to the field and then "secretly
"' See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 92, at 40-42.
"16 See Genesis 4:10.
117 See MISHNAH, supra note 36, Sanhedrin 4:5, at 388, reprinted in B. TALMUD, supra note
35, Sanhedrin 37a; accord, I MIDRASH RABBA4, supra note 1, Genesis 22:9, at 289. The
Mishnah's alternative explanation is that the plural denotes that Abel's blood was widely
scattered. See also infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
Il It should be noted that for Judaism, the Middle Ages begin earlier and end slightly later
than Western historical chronology: "From the viewpoint of Jewish history, the Middle Ages
may be defined as the period stretching from the early Moslem-Arab conquests in 632 CE, to
the spiritual crisis experienced by Jewry during the second half of the seventeenth century. ... "
HAIM H. BEN-SASSON, THE MIDDLE AGES, IN A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 385 (Haim H.
Ben-Sasson ed., 1976).
"9 See THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHJ'S COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:8, at 39
(alluding to other aggadic interpretations, but contending that his "is the plain meaning of the
passage."). As we shall see, however, Rashi's position is not so simple. See infra notes 152-53
and accompanying text.
120 According to another Midrash, however, Cain's jealousy and hatred, stemming from
God's rejection of his sacrifice and Cain's desire for Abel's beautiful sister, as well as Abel's
property, led Cain to declare, "I will kill Abel, my brother"--clearly indicating premeditation.
See PRKmEI D'RABBi ELIEZER, supra note 62, ch. 23, at 69-70.
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killed him.' ', 2' He also considers the possibility that Cain's intent in killing
Abel was to build the world up through himself rather than Abel, which was
unlikely absent the killing, since it was Abel's sacrifice that had been
accepted. '
The Sforno also effectively opts for murder one, making an interesting
textual argument based on the Hebrew word for "rose up.' 2' He states that
there was no prior argument between the two brothers, because, in another
passage in the Torah, the same verb was used in a case where the aggressor
ambushed his victim without any warning. 24 As such, Cain would be viewed
as a murderer lying in wait for his brother.
Others are not quite as hard on Cain. According to Ibn Ezra, a twelfth
century Spanish exegesist, grammarian, astronomer and physician, Cain told
Abel what God had said to him and blamed Abel for God's chastisement and
admonitions. 25 This interpretation suggests that, rather than lying in wait for
his brother, Cain engaged Abel in conversation and became progressively
more enraged in the course of the exchange, which ultimately led to the
slaying-arguably a basis for a mitigation claim.
Even more sympathetically, the Malbim states that Cain killed Abel
because he misunderstood God's admonition that, "sin crouches at his door
within," but that he could overcome it.' 26 According to this authority, Cain
thought that God was telling him Abel was a sinner and would try to lure him,
Cain, into wrongdoing.'1 The killing therefore was, in a sense, justified in
Cain's eyes as a case of spiritual self-defense."
Another factual issue, also bearing on the nature of Cain's crime, is the
manner in which he slayed his brother, and how he knew how to do so.'29 As
121 RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:8, at 89.
', See id. (contending that Cain thought his father would not have any more children).
'3 SFORNO, supra note 66, Genesis 4:8, at 36 n.8.
12 See Deuteronomy 19:11 (stating: "But if there will be a man who hates his fellow, and
ambushes him and rises up against him, and strikes him mortally and he dies...").
"5 See MIKRAOTGEDOLOTHA-MAOR, Genesis 4, at 101 (Aharon Samet& Daniel Biton eds.,
1980); see also RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:8, at 89
(contrasting the views of Rashi and Ibn Ezra).
126 MALBIM COMMENTARY ON THE TORAII, supra note 69, Genesis 4:8, at 306.
127 See id.
121 See id. (commenting on the verse, " 'Cain rose up against his brother Hevel and killed
him,' "the Malbim states: "Exactly in fulfillment of what the Lord had told him: thatyou can
master him.").
29 At first glance, Cain's age at the time of the crime would also appear to be relevant. The
Torah does not specify the brothers' ages, but, according to one Midrash, they were forty years
old (1 MIDRASH TANCHUMA, supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 17); considering, however, the lengthy
life expectancies of that period (e.g., Genesis 5:1-32), age forty may only have constituted
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to the method of killing, the Midrash suggests either a staff, that is, a weapon
that inflicts a bruise, or a stone, 30 which is a more formidable weapon. On the
question of knowledge, one Midrash reports that Cain told God that he did not
know that hitting Abel with a rock would kill him, but God immediately
pronounced sentence on Cain, thus indicating divine understanding that his
argument was specious."' Another Midrash says that Cain might have
deduced how to kill his brother by observing his father slaying animals for
sacrifices.'32 Presumably when the rabbinic authors of this Midrash referred
to animal sacrifices, they intended the traditional method, which would require
a clean slitting of the throat. 33 On the other hand, a Mishnah states that Abel's
blood "was cast over the trees and stones,"' 34 perhaps indicating a less than
precise multiple wounding, and Rashi says further that in fact Cain inflicted
many wounds on Abel because he did not know which spot would be fatal.'
A single, clean incision would be more suggestive of murder, whereas the
flailing approach is ambiguous. If the multiple wounds are solely the result of
ignorance, that, too, is consistent with murder. Indeed, a Midrash states that,
not knowing which part of the anatomy was susceptible to a mortal wound,
Cain inflicted many injuries on his brother's body, until he reached the neck
and succeeded in killing Abel. 36 On yet another hand, such wounds might
also be the product of a frenzied emotional state that would not meet the
standard for a cool, premeditated killing. 37 As one contemporary commenta-
adolescence. Compounding the uncertainty is I MIDRASHRABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:4,
at 182 (stating that "all agree that Abel was not in the world more than fifty days.") (footnote
omitted). But see EICHHORN, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that "[a]ll the children were also born
as full-grown adults.").
30 See 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:8, at 188.
"' See I MIDRASH TANcHuMA, supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 18. But see infra notes 147-56
and accompanying text, discussing the relative leniency of the divine punishment.
132 See id.
1 See MISHNAH, supra note 36, Hullin 1:2-4, at 513-14, reprinted in B. TALMUD, supra note
35, Hullin 15b, 18a, 19b.
"3 MISHNAH, supra note 36, Sanhedrin 4:5, at 388, reprinted in B. TALMUD, supra note 35,
Sanhedrin 37a.
'35 See THE PENTATEUCH AND RAsIu's CoMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:10, at 40
(relying on B. TALMUD, supra note 35, Sanhedrin 37b).
136 See 1 MIDRASH TANCHUMA, supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 18.
1 See People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968) (reducing a charge of murder one to
murder two, where the defendant had inflicted more than sixty wounds all over the victim's
body). But see DERSI4Owrrz, supra note 3, at 53 (arguing Cain inflicted multiple wounds to
make sure Abel died).
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tor puts it, Cain was "filled with blind fury and hate,.. chok[ing], kick[ing]
[and] bit[ing]" his brother's body. 3'
Arguably cutting in the other direction and suggesting a more culpable
slaying is Cain's encounter with God after the killing. God asks, "Where is
your brother," obviously knowing what had happened but giving Cain an
opportunity to confess and repent, just as He had done with Adam and Eve. 39
Cain lies to God, saying "I know not; am I my brother's keeper?"' 40 As Rashi
states, Cain "acted as if he could deceive the mind of the Most High.' 4' Or,
as a Midrash metaphorically puts it, God knocked on Cain's "flask... only to
find it a chamber pot." '42 Again, however, although attempting a cover-up in
response to divine interrogation may indicate that Cain was not the sharpest
tool in the shed, it does not necessarily suggest murder rather than manslaugh-
ter. After all, the latter is also a very serious crime and, given our protago-
nist's apparent propensity to lie, might also warrant a cover-up on his part.
Be that as it may, Cain's flippant rejoinder reveals a serious character flaw
that is highlighted in the midrashic literature, in which Cain expresses no
contrition. Instead, he gives excuse after excuse for the slaying, and
conveniently forgets God's recent lecture to him on the subject of free will. '"
He likens God to a derelict watchman who apprehends the thief only after the
theft and is met with the defense that it is the thief s job to steal and the
"o EIcHHORN, supra note 5, at 67.
139 Genesis 3:9-13.
140 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:9, at 188:
[Cain's question] may be compared to a prefect who was walking in the
middle of the road, and found a man slain and another standing over him.
'Who killed him?' he demanded. 'I will ask you [that question] instead of
your asking me,' rejoined the other. 'You have answered nothing,' he
retorted (footnote omitted). Again, it is like the case of a man who entered
a garden, and gathered mulberries and ate them. The owner of the garden
pursued him, demanding, 'What are you holding?' 'Nothing,' was the reply.
'But surely your hands are stained [with the juice]!'
On the other hand, Professor Leibowitz views Cain's response as an "attempt to deaden the
voice of his conscience [which] was in vain"). See also LEmowrTz, supra note 92, at 48.
141 THE PENTATEUCH AND RAsHI'S COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:9, at 39. See
also PIRKEI D'RABBI ELIEZER, supra note 62, ch. 23, at 70 (noting Cain thought he could
deceive God by burying his brother in the earth). There is another Midrash, however, stating
that Adam and Eve did not know what to do with Abel's body until they saw a raven burying
his mate. See THE BOOK OF LEGENDS 24 (Hayim N. Bialik & Yehoshua H. Ravnitzky eds.,
1992).
142 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 19:11, at 156. Even more graphically, see 6
MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Numbers 20:6, at 791, which refers to Cain as a "vessel full
of urine," because he tried to deceive God rather than immediately confessing.
143 Genesis 4:7.
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watchman's to prevent theft, therefore the latter is to blame, not the thief.'"
Alternatively, Cain admits the killing but criticizes God for having given him
the evil inclination. Shifting to God's omnipotence, Cain again asserts divine
blame, this time based on God's role as guardian over all the world, Who
nonetheless allows Abel to be killed. "5 Never at a loss for excuses, he says to
God, with even more awesome temerity, "It is Your fault, for if You had
accepted my sacrifice, I would not have been jealous." Finally, Cain asks
rhetorically, "Did I know if I hit Abel with a rock that it would kill him?"'"
Following Cain's disingenuous disclaimer of responsibility for his brother's
welfare, God metes out punishment-inability or diminished ability to till the
soil, banishment and wandering the earth. 47 Banishment suggests manslaugh-
ter rather than murder. 48 As already noted, under Jewish law, the punishment
for intentional premeditated murder is death by beheading." 9 The sentence for
inadvertent, that is, negligent killings, however, is exile to a city of refuge."'
That fact is not conclusive, because, while banishment fits nicely with
consignment to a different location, wandering the earth does not.' Indeed,
Rashi's commentaries seem to reflect this uncertainty. Even though he
apparently regards Cain's slaying as murder, 52 Rashi also comments on
Genesis 4:16, which says that Cain "settled in the land of Nod, east of Eden."
Rashi notes that that locale was a shelter for negligent killers, and observes
that the cities of refuge set up by Moses were in the east, "3 thus at least
inferentially lending support to the notion that Cain's act was something other
than premeditated murder.
'44 See 1 MIDRASH TANCHuMA, supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 18; see also 1 GINZBERG, supra
note 60, at 110.
,45 See 1 GINZBERG, supra note 60, at 110.
'4 1 MIDRASH TANCHUMA, supra note 1, Breishis 9, at 18; 1 GINZBERG, supra note 60, at
110. See also EiCHHORN, supra note 5, at 74: "For all You know, I never intended to kill him.
I just meant to give him a sound thrashing."
147 See Genesis 4:12.
'41 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text, discussing exile and cities of refuge under
Jewish law.
141 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Banishment to a city of refuge may not
really be a punishment, since it protects the killer from the blood avenger.
"' In fact, if a person convicted of negligent homicide wanders outside the city of refuge, he
is liable to death at the hand of the blood avenger. THE CODE OF MAIMONMDES, supra note 43,
Murder and Preservation of Life 5:9, at 211.
'2 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
'"THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI'S COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:16, at 42. See




It is also conceivable that, although Cain's act was murder, his punishment
could "not be as the judgment of other murderers,"'54 and was consequently
mitigated to reflect Cain's lesser moral blameworthiness, just as modem
statutes give a wide range of punishments for various degrees of homicide. 55
As the Midrash explains, he "had none from whom to learn [the enormity of
his crime], but henceforth, All who slay shall be slain.1 56
Upon hearing of his relatively lenient sanction, Cain continues to parry
with God, protesting that "whoever meets me will kill me,"' 57 and arguing that,
far from leniency, this is a death sentence. But rather than viewing Cain as an
ingrate, the Ramban interprets the slayer's statements collectively as evidence
of genuine contrition" 8 and recognition of God's omnipotence, stating:
14 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:12, at 191.
155 Under contemporary American law, there is a range of sanctions for murder. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a), (b) (Deering 2000) (imposing sanctions of death, life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, or 25 years to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree, and
sanctions of fifteen years to life imprisonment for murder in the second degree); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01, 2903.02, 2929.02(a) (Anderson 2000) (providing sentence of death or
life imprisonment and a fine of up to $25,000 for aggravated murder, and imposing sentence of
fifteen years to life imprisonment and a fine of up to $25,000 for murder); TEXAS PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 12.31, 12.32, 19.03, 19.04 (West 2000) (making capital murder punishable by death
or life imprisonment, and murder punishable by life imprisonment or a term of 5-to-99 years and
a fine of up to $10,000).
1 56 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:12, at 191 (footnote omitted).
Professor Dershowitz takes issue with the Midrash's reasoning, based, inter alia, on (1)
murder's status as a malum in se offense; (2) Cain's understanding of death through his
experience with animals and his brother's sacrifices thereof; and (3) his cover-up denial to God.
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 53-54. Professor Dershowitz concludes that "God was not doing
a very good job deterring crime... He was allowing humans to get away with murder!" Id. at
58.
As noted earlier, however, at least under Jewish law, only deliberate, premeditated murder
subjected the slayer to capital punishment. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
Moreover, numerous procedural safeguards such as the two-eyewitness rule rendered conviction
difficult. Id. Consequently, under Jewish law, Cain could not have been convicted in a human
court, but was of course subject to punishment at the hands of God. As we note hereafter, that
Cain "got away with murder" is far from clear. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text,
which discusses the deferral and ultimate imposition of a death penalty on Cain.
'S7 Genesis 4:14. According to Rashi, Cain was concerned that animals would kill him, for
the only other humans were his parents, of whom he was not afraid. THE PENTATEUCH AND
RASHI's COMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:14, at 42.
"58 See RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:13, at 91. But see
THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI's COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:13, at 40 (relying on
a Midrash in interpreting the verse, "My punishment is greater than I can bear," as a question
rather than a confession). The question, according to Rashi, is," 'You (God) bear the worlds
above and below and my iniquity can you not bear?' " Depending on Cain's intonation, the
question can be viewed as arrogant or simply inquisitive. Rashi says it is asked in "wonder-
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The correct plain interpretation is that it is a confession....
The sense of this is that Cain said before G-d: 'Behold, my sin
is great, and You have punished me exceedingly, but guard
me that I should not be punished more than You have decreed
upon me for by being a fugitive and wanderer and unable to
build myself a house and fences at any place, the beasts will
kill me for your shadow has departed from me.' Thus Cain
confessed that man is impotent to save himself by his own
strength but only by the watchfulness of the Supreme One
upon him.15 9
According to one translation, God's rejoinder to Cain's concerns is in the
nature of a threatening reassurance; He announces that "whosoever slays Cain,
vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold,"'' referring to Cain's future
killer. 6 Although one may consider the proposed punishment of Cain's
potential assailant to be wildly disproportionate,'62 the passage may also be
viewed as directed not only to the assailant, but also to Cain, as a figurative
declaration of divine comfort, designed to assure Cain that no one will dare to
kill him.
An alternative translation of God's "sevenfold" declaration suggests instead
that the divine sanction against Cain went beyond a curse on his labor, together
with banishment and consignment to wandering. The latter version has God
responding to Cain's "dead man walking" concerns by saying that it is only
ment."
"9 RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:13, at 91 (footnote
omitted). See also infra note 174 (discussing conflicting rabbinic views of atonement).
16o See, e.g., THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 53, Genesis 4:15, at 15 (using
the translation quoted in the text).
161 See RAMBAN COMMENTARYONTHETORAH, supra note I, Genesis 4:23, at 95 (stating that
the meaning of the passage
is, according to its real sense, that G-d said: 'Therefore, whosoever slayeth
Cain will have vengeance taken on him sevenfold, for I will punish his slayer
seven times for his sin, since I have promised Cain that he will not be slain
in view of his fear of Me and his confession before Me.').
162 This is essentially the position taken by Professor Dershowitz, who asserts "Yet another
unjust threat of disproportionate punishment!" He concedes, however, that potential wrongdoers
have been duly warned and that sevenfold may be difficult to calculate "in the context of killing
another." DERSHOWITZ, supra note 3, at 5 1.
Cf. David Daube, Judas, 82 CAL. L. REv. 95, 102 (1994) (noting that "[t]o this day, an
educated Western public just cannot brook Asian irrationalism'). See, for example, Cain utterly
damned for a monstrous deed in Genesis 4:11-12 and fully re-elevated in Genesis 4:15-18.
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after seven generations that Cain will be slain.163 This translation is based on
an interpretation of the passage by Rashi,'" who refers to a Midrash positing
that Cain was killed unintentionally by his descendant, Lamech, 16 a nice,
albeit diluted, "measure for measure" touch--Cain killed his brother and was
in turn killed by his several-greats grandson." Thus, according to the Rashi
163 See THE CHUMASH, supra note 4, Commentary to Genesis 4:15, at 21:
Our rendering follows Rashi who interprets this as 'an abbreviated verse with
an implied clause: Whoever slays Cain will be punished (this phrase is
unstated, but understood). As for Cain himself, only after seven generations
willlexecute My vengeance upon him, when Lemech, one of his descendants,
will arise and slay him.'
'6 THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI's COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:15, at 41.
'65 Id., Genesis 4:23, at 45. Rashi's account of this slaying is as follows:
[For Lamech was blind and Tubal-cain [Lamech's son] led him, and he
[Tubal-cain] saw Cain who appeared to him like an animal. He [therefore]
said to his father to draw the bow, and he killed him As soon as he [Lamech]
learned that it was Cain his grandfather, he struck one hand against the other
(in remorse), and struck his son (accidentally) between them and killed him.
Lamech thereafter argued to his wives, who had, according to a Midrash, separated from
him sexually, that since the punishment of Cain, who had "killed intentionally," was deferred
for seven generations, he, who had killed inadvertently, should have his sanction deferred for
many times seven generations. Id., Genesis 4:24, at 46-47.
According to the Ramban, Lamech assured his wives that God would not punish him
because he "did not slay a man by wounds, nor a child by bruises, as did Cain ..... " RAMBAN
COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:23, at 96. In response to his wives'
concerns that he would be punished for teaching his son Tubal-cain to make swords and other
instruments of war, see supra note 58, Lamech argued that "death caused by wounds and bruises
[the method used by Cain to kill Abel] is a worse death than by the sword."
'" The concept known as "measure for measure," or, in Hebrew, "mida k'neged mida,"
essentially provides that, as you have done, so will it then be done to you. According to the
Midrash, Cain was killed by Lamech, his descendant, seven generations later, but the slaying
was not intentional. See supra note 165, describing Cain's death and Lamech's characterization
of the killing as inadvertent. Thus, arguably, although not perfectly congruent, just as Cain
killed Abel intentionally, but perhaps without premeditation, and was not punishable in the
human court (see supra note 45 and accompanying text) he, too, was killed by a blood relative
without premeditation, although concededly unintentionally. Since such killings cannot be
punished by the court, God Himself imposes the appropriate sanction. For example, Exodus
21:13 provides, "And if a man not lie in wait, but God cause it to come to hand; then I will
appoint thee a place whither he may flee." The Gemara gives the following explanation of this
verse:
For what is Scripture here speaking about? About two men, one of whom
killed a person with premeditation and the other killed inadvertently, and in
neither case were there witnesses to the deed who could testify about it.
Consequently, the former was not put to death and latter was not forced into
banishment to a city of refuge .... Now God brings them together at the
same inn. He who killed with premeditation happens to sit beneath a ladder,
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exegesis, "sevenfold" refers to the amount of time God wishes to wait before
exacting final payment for Cain's crime.
67
On the other hand, this deferral, which enabled Cain to marry and
procreate,'" suggests divine leniency. By the same token, however, Cain did
not die of old age or natural causes.'69 God shortened his life, which may be
viewed as a punishment in addition to exile and wandering the earth. The
same is true even if one accepts the alternative midrashic view that God
suspended judgment on Cain "until the Flood came and swept him away."' 70
Yet another midrashic account is somewhat sympathetic, suggesting that
God was half lenient in response to Cain's half repentance. Commenting on
the colloquy between the two protagonists, the Midrash presents an anguished
defendant, who responds plaintively to the divine inquiry, "Where is Abel thy
brother": 'Sovereign of the Universe,' replied he, 'Abel and I brought Thee a
gift; Abel's Thou didst accept, while me Thou didst turn away with aching
heart.'
71
Then, moving from defense to offense, Cain continues: 'Seekest Thou him
from me? Surely he is to be sought from none but Thee, for Thou keepest
and the other who killed inadvertently ascends the ladder and falls when
descending it, upon the man who killed with premeditation, and kills him.
Witnesses now being present they testify against him, so compelling him to
be banished to one of the cities of refuge. The result is that he who killed
inadvertently is actually banished and he who killed with premeditation
actually suffers death.
B. TALMUD, supra note 35, Makkoth I Ob; THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHi'S COMMENTARY, supra
note 58, Exodus 21:13, at 235-36.
167 See THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI'S COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:15, at 41;
see also id., Genesis 4:19, at 43 (interpreting the text about Lamech to establish that, by having
offspring, Lamech had raised "a seventh generation" before he killed Cain).
'" See 3 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Exodus 31:17, at 400 (noting that Cain "begat a
hundred children"); see also 8 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Ecclesiastes 6:3, at 159.
'9 See RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:17, at 93, saying of
Cain that "his hoary head did not go down to the grave in peace, rather he saw his destruction
and all his seed with him" (footnotes omitted). But cf 3 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1,
Exodus 31:17, at 400 & n.4 (stating that "Cain lived as long as Adam-So that the days of his
years are many-for he outlived his father by seven hundred and twenty-six years."). But see
I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 23:4, at 195, in which Lamech and his two wives
go to Adam for advice on whether they should continue to procreate, which means that Adam
was alive at the time Lamech killed Cain.
170 1 MIDIRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 32:5, at 252. See also RAMBAN COMMEN-
TARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis4:17, at 93 (noting Cain's death in the flood after
living "many years.").
171 2 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 97, at 903.
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watch over all creatures.'7 2 Clearly unpersuaded, God curses Cain, whose
rejoinder was nothing if not persistent, noting that in the future God would
forgive "sixty myriads" of the Jewish people for multiple sins committed in
the desert following the exodus from Egypt.77 The divine reaction is simply
extraordinary. Abruptly shifting ground, God says:" 'If I do not forgive Cain,
I will shut the door in the face of all penitents.' Consequently God forgave
him half; yet because his repentance was incomplete, He did not forgive him
all his sins."174
God considered Cain's repentance incomplete because he played the
lawyer, demanding his right to a pardon, rather than appearing as a supplicant
seeking mercy. 75
In still another example of the conflicting views of Cain's character,
commenting on his response to God and his attitude after the killing, one
Midrash gives Cain's acknowledgment that his sin was more severe than
Adam's, whereas another has the wrongdoer protesting his punishment as too
stringent,"' when he says, "My sin is too great to bear."' 7 Again, when God
172 id.
' See id. (citing Numbers 14:18-20).
'74 Id. at 903-04 (footnote omitted).
Another Midrash presents the conflicting views of two rabbis regarding atonement. One
takes the position that repentance brings half atonement, and prayer, complete atonement, while
the other takes the directly opposite position. Conjecturing on the source of the former's belief
that repentance effects half atonement, the Midrash cites the case of Cain, concerning whom,
"half of the decree was withheld" when he repented. Asking how it is known that Cain repented,
the Midrash relies on Cain's poignant statement, "[m]ine iniquity is too great to be forgiven."
4 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Leviticus 10:5, at 126. Further asking how it is known that
"half the sentence was withheld," the Midrash interprets the Torah text as imposing a sanction
of wandering, but not making Cain a fugitive. Id. See also 7 MiDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1,
Deuteronomy 8:1, at 147-48.
'" 2 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 97, at 904 & n. 1. The Midrash thereafter
explains that God first cursed Cain, condemning him to be a fugitive and a wanderer, and then
relented by allowing him to dwell in the land of Nod, which means wandering. Thus, he
remained a wanderer but was not a fugitive. The Ramban says that the meaning of the biblical
verse "is that Cain did not traverse the entire world, but he dwelt in that land, perpetually
wandering therein and not resting at all in any one place thereof, and so it was forever called 'the
land of Nod (wandering)' after him." RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1,
Genesis 4:16, at 92; see also IBN EZRA COMMENTARY ON THE ToRAH (Mehokkai Yehuda),
Genesis 4:12, at 84-85 (undated) (noting that Cain was both in exile (in "Nod") and wandering
therein); COMMENTARY OF RABBI KRNSKi ON IBN EZRA,Genesis 4:12, at 85 (pointing out that
Cain's original punishment included exile (Hebrew, "Nod") and wandering (Hebrew, "nah"),
but he received only the penalty of exile, relying on Genesis 4:16, referring only to "Nod").
176 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:12, at 191; but see 2 MIDRASH RABBAH,
supra note 1, Genesis 75:9, at 695 (suggesting that Esau drew support for his evil plot to slay
his brother Jacob from God's treatment of Cain, by reasoning that "Cain slew his brother, yet
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places a protective mark on Cain in response to his lament that he will be
killed while wandering the earth, 78 the midrashic rabbis argue about the nature
of the sign. One suggests that it was a special glow, like an "orb of the sun,"
prompting the rejoinder that Cain was a "wretch" who received leprosy rather
than sunshine to distinguish him.'79 Another says he was given a dog, 8 which
is viewed as a contemptible animal.'8 ' A pair of rabbis debates whether Cain
was made a divine example to murderers or to penitents.'8 2 Seizing on the
verse that Cain then "left the presence" of God,' 3 the Midrash asks rhetori-
cally how this is possible, since God is everywhere, with two rabbis asserting
that he went out as a divine deceiver and another responding that he departed
"rejoicing" and that: Adam met him and asked him, 'How did your case go?'
'I repented and am reconciled,' replied he. Thereupon Adam began beating
his face, crying, 'So great is the power of repentance, and I did not know!" "
Thus, viewed in their totality, the midrashic assessments of the extent of
Cain's blameworthiness and punishment can fairly be characterized as
consistently inconsistent or at least ambivalent-a not uncommon feature of
the midrashic literature.'8 5
V. CONCLUSION
What is one to make of these inherently conflicting midrashic accounts
with respect to Cain's culpability and character? The rabbinic sages are
unfazed by such seeming contradictions and in fact welcome them. As we
have stated elsewhere, "the Torah is read on four levels, has seventy meanings,
and is like a rock, which, when struck, splits into many pieces, and while it
God did nothing to him."). Another Midrash has Esau drawing the lesson that "Cain was a fool,
for he killed his brother during his father's lifetime, not knowing that his father would be fruitful
and multiply. I will not do so,..." 4 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Leviticus 27:11, at 356;
see also 9 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Esther 7:23, at 101.
'7 Genesis 4:13.
171 See id. at 14-15.
'79 See 1 MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:12, at 191. Rashi asserts that the sign
was a letter from God's Holy Name placed on Cain's forehead. THE PENTATEUCH AND RASHI'S
COMMENTARY, supra note 58, Genesis 4:15, at 41.
"0 See I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:12, at 191.
"' See RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:13, at 92.
182 See id.
,83 Genesis 4:16. The Ramban says this means that Cain would never again stand before
God. RAMBAN COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, supra note 1, Genesis 4:16, at 92.
18 I MIDRASH RABBAH, supra note 1, Genesis 22:13, at 191-92.
,' See supra note 49 and accompanying text, discussing this feature.
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may yield a plethora of conflicting opinions, all are, at least in a mystical
sense, correct, constituting the words of the living God."' 86 Thus, even if the
sages "present a number of differing views on the same subject, they all
contain a certain aspect of the truth. Although they may be contradictory on
the surface, they all hold true in a certain sense." '87
Variegated perceptions of the truth are indeed part and parcel of the human
condition. The Torah, and the book of Genesis in particular, is on one level a
collection of stories, and that is probably because "we are more persuasive
when we tell stories,"'88 and indeed narratives have become an accepted albeit
controversial aspect of legal scholarship.' 89 How people understand a
particular story depends in turn on their own collections of stories that make
up their memories. So when people hear stories, even new ones, as listeners,
they hear them as old stories-one of their stories.'" Thus, on the one hand,
Cain may be an evil, greedy, premeditated, unrepentant, cold-blooded
murderer, or, on the other, an anguished, shamed, less favored child, whose
anger explodes in a frenzied attack on his brother that may not even have been
an intentional killing, and is, in any event, one that he deeply regrets. To the
extent persons have stories of their own-stories of sibling rivalry or of their
role in the family or of their relationship to God or other authority fig-
ures-that will in large part determine their understanding of the story of Cain
and Abel. As is their wont, the Torah, the Talmud, the aggadic literature, and
the numerous commentaries, leave the matter in delicious equipoise. And, as
'86 Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on "Eye for Eye"
and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REv. 505, 537 (citing B. TALMUD, supra note 35, Erubin
13b).
187 1 WEISSMAN, supra note 49, at ix.
'83 ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: A NEW LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL MEMORY
10(1990).
189 E.g., compare ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW (1993) (endorsing
narratives as a means of understanding the experiences of traditionally excluded classes), with
Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255,280-85 (1994) (advising caution
in the use of stories for purposes of legal analysis). Cf Cover, supra note 107, at 4: "No set of
legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture." (footnotes
omitted). See also Sally Frank, Eve Was Right To Eat the "Apple": The Importance of
Narrative in the Art of Lawyering, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 118 (1996) (arguing that
"[w]ithout an examination of how people tell and understand stories, lawyers may be missing
opportunities to convince others of their clients' positions," and that, "[b]y showing that Eve can
be defended plausibly by a creative lawyer, I have shown that lawyers can develop defenses for
even their most vilified clients.").
'" See SCHANK, supra note 188, at 58.
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is the case elsewhere in Judaism, the journey may be more important than the
destination.'9
... Cf., e.g., Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule
Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 969-70 (1988) ("[lIt is the debates
themselves, rather than the rules propounded, that are the glory of the Talmud"); LOuis JACOBS,
THE TALMUDIC ARGUMENT 1 (1984) ("The Babylonian Talmud consists almost entirely of
arguments having as their aim the elucidation of the law, ruling, religious teaching or ethical
idea.... The whole constitutes reasoning processes which... have contributed more to the
shaping of the Jewish mind than any other factor.").
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